)]}'
{"/PATCHSET_LEVEL":[{"author":{"_account_id":5263,"name":"Jeremy Stanley","display_name":"fungi","email":"fungi@yuggoth.org","username":"fungi","status":"missing, presumed fed"},"change_message_id":"6507d67c8d6f8e93ed4e4323d6cb579be3025269","unresolved":false,"context_lines":[],"source_content_type":"","patch_set":1,"id":"b1759b99_5b512bb2","updated":"2026-11-02 15:16:25.000000000","message":"It\u0027s worth keeping in mind that tmpfs isn\u0027t intended as a security measure, and being kept in tmpfs doesn\u0027t prevent the data from being written to disk either. The contents of tmpfs can be paged out to swap under memory pressure, just like the copies being held in process memory during use, so it\u0027s advisable to make sure to use encrypted swap anyway if your concern is leaking keys at rest, e.g. during harware disposal or cold theft.\n\nBut if that\u0027s the case, then why not just do all scratch work in an encrypted volume too? Whether it\u0027s in encrypted swap or an encrypted filesystem, the safeguards are effectively the same.","commit_id":"977057d5312fa4aa4fe44cf44be44d7e33171345"}]}