)]}'
{"specs/backlog/HMAC-Signature-Based-Token.rst":[{"author":{"_account_id":2903,"name":"Morgan Fainberg","email":"morgan.fainberg@gmail.com","username":"mdrnstm"},"change_message_id":"ce1f6472c25937244d8eaccf94540b41f0a5fbe2","unresolved":false,"context_lines":[{"line_number":113,"context_line":"be storing entire token data only `token_id`, `hmac_key` and `expiration_time`"},{"line_number":114,"context_line":"will be stored. While validation signature Keystone will handover `hmac_key`"},{"line_number":115,"context_line":"and `expiration_time` to the middleware, which will cache this data till its"},{"line_number":116,"context_line":"expiration for future use."},{"line_number":117,"context_line":""},{"line_number":118,"context_line":"``Pros``: Less maintenance, less network footprint."},{"line_number":119,"context_line":"``Cons``: Caching infrastructure for middleware, token revocation will be"}],"source_content_type":"text/x-rst","patch_set":1,"id":"da86d52c_60a68155","line":116,"updated":"2015-02-07 22:47:51.000000000","message":"This does not solve the issue of unbounded token table growth. At a certain point the volume of rows will still hit the same issue as we have today, and flushing will still result in gaplocking and overall issues with keystone performance.\n\nThe whole point of the AE Token spec was to eliminate storing of tokens while meeting the needs of smaller tokens.","commit_id":"9c06539af872273a0611c28ce81d0b59402964b5"},{"author":{"_account_id":2903,"name":"Morgan Fainberg","email":"morgan.fainberg@gmail.com","username":"mdrnstm"},"change_message_id":"16d425948e96dfd116079710c80e649613a88f8e","unresolved":false,"context_lines":[{"line_number":86,"context_line":"and token expiration time. Example below:"},{"line_number":87,"context_line":""},{"line_number":88,"context_line":"Message \u003d \u0027user_id:project_id:endpoint_URL:roles:service_id:region:endpoint_id:"},{"line_number":89,"context_line":"           expiration_time\u0027"},{"line_number":90,"context_line":""},{"line_number":91,"context_line":"This way HMAC signature will be bind to user, project, expiration time etc."},{"line_number":92,"context_line":""}],"source_content_type":"text/x-rst","patch_set":2,"id":"da86d52c_f1ad4132","line":89,"updated":"2015-02-12 01:42:49.000000000","message":"Does this take into account Federation, Trusts, and/or OAuth? Without clear support for those features (aka what we solve today, a new token format will not be considered for inclusion). \n\nThis information list looks to be insufficient to cover todays use-cases.\n\nAs a similar proposal, AE Tokens has keystone rebuild the token body based upon the limited information in the AE Token Body itself. This allows for maintaining a smaller token at the cost of slightly higher validate look-up costs. Fortunately caching can help limit this impact.\n\nThis proposal seems to indicate tokens have an unbounded size (same issue as PKI tokens do).","commit_id":"a1a79d465f67e42c7ed5e1bf6c059a5637d96477"},{"author":{"_account_id":994,"name":"Arvind Tiwari","email":"arvindt7@gmail.com","username":"arvind-tiwari"},"change_message_id":"01546a2f2aad35e866e2d773255314bd92b2d3e0","unresolved":false,"context_lines":[{"line_number":86,"context_line":"and token expiration time. Example below:"},{"line_number":87,"context_line":""},{"line_number":88,"context_line":"Message \u003d \u0027user_id:project_id:endpoint_URL:roles:service_id:region:endpoint_id:"},{"line_number":89,"context_line":"           expiration_time\u0027"},{"line_number":90,"context_line":""},{"line_number":91,"context_line":"This way HMAC signature will be bind to user, project, expiration time etc."},{"line_number":92,"context_line":""}],"source_content_type":"text/x-rst","patch_set":2,"id":"da86d52c_a75314e1","line":89,"in_reply_to":"da86d52c_f1ad4132","updated":"2015-02-15 15:21:50.000000000","message":"Message and signature are the means of to validated user authenticity and \nclaim validation. I not sure if adding authentication method (Federation, Trusts, and/or OAuth) will add any value. (I need some suggestions on this). Practically we can add anything in the message to generate signature (e.g. federation, trust, etc..) as long as it is adding some value.\n\nIn the above message endpoint_id/endpoint_URL are same, I will remove one.\nIf audit_id is needed by keystone while validation, we can add it in the message.\n\nI think we can compare it with UUID token response but not PKI as there won\u0027t be any encrypted part. IMO, token response size should be controlled by the proper scoping (e.g. service, endpoint, region) token and that is why we need to have signature per endpoints in the token response.","commit_id":"a1a79d465f67e42c7ed5e1bf6c059a5637d96477"},{"author":{"_account_id":2903,"name":"Morgan Fainberg","email":"morgan.fainberg@gmail.com","username":"mdrnstm"},"change_message_id":"16d425948e96dfd116079710c80e649613a88f8e","unresolved":false,"context_lines":[{"line_number":96,"context_line":"use `X-Auth-Header`). They are also required to provide necessary information"},{"line_number":97,"context_line":"(e.g. user_id, project_id, service_id, region_id, user roles on project) so"},{"line_number":98,"context_line":"that the middleware can rebuild the message to generate the signature. Endpoint"},{"line_number":99,"context_line":"URL will be taken from the request."},{"line_number":100,"context_line":""},{"line_number":101,"context_line":"Middleware will generate the message using the information provided by user and"},{"line_number":102,"context_line":"call Keystone along with the signature and the message. Keystone will use the"}],"source_content_type":"text/x-rst","patch_set":2,"id":"da86d52c_918085c0","line":99,"updated":"2015-02-12 01:42:49.000000000","message":"This looks to break the current workflow where nova (for example) would talk to glance utilizing the user\u0027s token. This is because the endpoint is explicitly bound in the token.\n\nI admit I might be mis-reading it, but some clarification wont hurt here.","commit_id":"a1a79d465f67e42c7ed5e1bf6c059a5637d96477"},{"author":{"_account_id":994,"name":"Arvind Tiwari","email":"arvindt7@gmail.com","username":"arvind-tiwari"},"change_message_id":"01546a2f2aad35e866e2d773255314bd92b2d3e0","unresolved":false,"context_lines":[{"line_number":96,"context_line":"use `X-Auth-Header`). They are also required to provide necessary information"},{"line_number":97,"context_line":"(e.g. user_id, project_id, service_id, region_id, user roles on project) so"},{"line_number":98,"context_line":"that the middleware can rebuild the message to generate the signature. Endpoint"},{"line_number":99,"context_line":"URL will be taken from the request."},{"line_number":100,"context_line":""},{"line_number":101,"context_line":"Middleware will generate the message using the information provided by user and"},{"line_number":102,"context_line":"call Keystone along with the signature and the message. Keystone will use the"}],"source_content_type":"text/x-rst","patch_set":2,"id":"da86d52c_a718741f","line":99,"in_reply_to":"da86d52c_918085c0","updated":"2015-02-15 15:21:50.000000000","message":"IMO, if we are not storing the token then there is no use of UUID as there will not be any information associated with UUID. \n\nIn the current workflow, \n1. User provide UUID to Nova, to spin up VM for example.\n2. Nova validate it from Keystone and get the entire token with all endpoints.\n3. Nova uses the UUID and glance endpoint to talk to glance.\n\nIn this workflow Keystone is responsible to provide the trust (endpoint, roles) associated with token.\n\nWe may need to change the work flow little bit with HMAc tokens.\n\nClient/USer have to provide endpoint, message and signature generated for glance endpoint upfront/on demand. (we need to think through)\n\nI will add mode wording, but I don\u0027t any value of UUID in non persitent tokens.","commit_id":"a1a79d465f67e42c7ed5e1bf6c059a5637d96477"},{"author":{"_account_id":2903,"name":"Morgan Fainberg","email":"morgan.fainberg@gmail.com","username":"mdrnstm"},"change_message_id":"16d425948e96dfd116079710c80e649613a88f8e","unresolved":false,"context_lines":[{"line_number":103,"context_line":"message to generate the digest and match it with the signature provided by"},{"line_number":104,"context_line":"middleware. Message digest will generated using same HMAC-Key and hash"},{"line_number":105,"context_line":"algorithm (e.g. Sha-256, Sha-512) which was used by Keystone to generate the"},{"line_number":106,"context_line":"original signature."},{"line_number":107,"context_line":""},{"line_number":108,"context_line":"Validation will be done by matching the message digest with the signature,"},{"line_number":109,"context_line":"originally provided by user. Signature validation would prove the user"}],"source_content_type":"text/x-rst","patch_set":2,"id":"da86d52c_c116aa48","line":106,"updated":"2015-02-12 01:42:49.000000000","message":"Is this relying on Keystone to do the validation (aka. manage the HMAC keys) or is this relying on the endpoint to determine the digest?\n\nIn the former case, this works like the UUID workflow and should be specifically stated as much. In the latter case, it would imply incompatibility when nova would need to talk to glance on the user\u0027s behalf. This would be because the HMAC keys would need to be shared with the endpoints. \n\nWith the PKI and UUID workflows we do not trust the endpoints with the capability to issue new tokens, sharing the HMAC key with the endpoints would give them the ability to issue tokens without involving Keystone. Sharing the HMAC with all endpoints is a significant security risk that changes the threat profile.","commit_id":"a1a79d465f67e42c7ed5e1bf6c059a5637d96477"},{"author":{"_account_id":1941,"name":"Lin Hua Cheng","email":"os.lcheng@gmail.com","username":"lin-hua-cheng"},"change_message_id":"7def2c679371959ee8e863f8fcc5cba09ef8a42d","unresolved":false,"context_lines":[{"line_number":103,"context_line":"message to generate the digest and match it with the signature provided by"},{"line_number":104,"context_line":"middleware. Message digest will generated using same HMAC-Key and hash"},{"line_number":105,"context_line":"algorithm (e.g. Sha-256, Sha-512) which was used by Keystone to generate the"},{"line_number":106,"context_line":"original signature."},{"line_number":107,"context_line":""},{"line_number":108,"context_line":"Validation will be done by matching the message digest with the signature,"},{"line_number":109,"context_line":"originally provided by user. Signature validation would prove the user"}],"source_content_type":"text/x-rst","patch_set":2,"id":"da86d52c_bf143d44","line":106,"in_reply_to":"da86d52c_c116aa48","updated":"2015-02-13 00:55:26.000000000","message":"Good catch about sharing the HMAC-key introducing security issue","commit_id":"a1a79d465f67e42c7ed5e1bf6c059a5637d96477"},{"author":{"_account_id":994,"name":"Arvind Tiwari","email":"arvindt7@gmail.com","username":"arvind-tiwari"},"change_message_id":"01546a2f2aad35e866e2d773255314bd92b2d3e0","unresolved":false,"context_lines":[{"line_number":103,"context_line":"message to generate the digest and match it with the signature provided by"},{"line_number":104,"context_line":"middleware. Message digest will generated using same HMAC-Key and hash"},{"line_number":105,"context_line":"algorithm (e.g. Sha-256, Sha-512) which was used by Keystone to generate the"},{"line_number":106,"context_line":"original signature."},{"line_number":107,"context_line":""},{"line_number":108,"context_line":"Validation will be done by matching the message digest with the signature,"},{"line_number":109,"context_line":"originally provided by user. Signature validation would prove the user"}],"source_content_type":"text/x-rst","patch_set":2,"id":"da86d52c_87e290ff","line":106,"in_reply_to":"da86d52c_c116aa48","updated":"2015-02-15 15:21:50.000000000","message":"I think it problem with my wording, I will rephrase it.\n\n*Key won\u0027t leave Keystone* that means service at the endpoint have to pass message and signature to keystone to validate. Keystone will response Yes/No.","commit_id":"a1a79d465f67e42c7ed5e1bf6c059a5637d96477"},{"author":{"_account_id":2903,"name":"Morgan Fainberg","email":"morgan.fainberg@gmail.com","username":"mdrnstm"},"change_message_id":"16d425948e96dfd116079710c80e649613a88f8e","unresolved":false,"context_lines":[{"line_number":108,"context_line":"Validation will be done by matching the message digest with the signature,"},{"line_number":109,"context_line":"originally provided by user. Signature validation would prove the user"},{"line_number":110,"context_line":"authenticity and claims to access the service. Signature validation will fail"},{"line_number":111,"context_line":"if user is trying to fool the system by any means."},{"line_number":112,"context_line":""},{"line_number":113,"context_line":"Token revocation will be done using attribute based revocation policy, Keystone"},{"line_number":114,"context_line":"will check the policy as part for validating the signature."}],"source_content_type":"text/x-rst","patch_set":2,"id":"da86d52c_b1466979","line":111,"updated":"2015-02-12 01:42:49.000000000","message":"\"fool the system by any means\" is highly inspecific, suggest clarifying to say something like \"Signature validation will fail if the user modifies the data within the token.\"","commit_id":"a1a79d465f67e42c7ed5e1bf6c059a5637d96477"},{"author":{"_account_id":994,"name":"Arvind Tiwari","email":"arvindt7@gmail.com","username":"arvind-tiwari"},"change_message_id":"01546a2f2aad35e866e2d773255314bd92b2d3e0","unresolved":false,"context_lines":[{"line_number":108,"context_line":"Validation will be done by matching the message digest with the signature,"},{"line_number":109,"context_line":"originally provided by user. Signature validation would prove the user"},{"line_number":110,"context_line":"authenticity and claims to access the service. Signature validation will fail"},{"line_number":111,"context_line":"if user is trying to fool the system by any means."},{"line_number":112,"context_line":""},{"line_number":113,"context_line":"Token revocation will be done using attribute based revocation policy, Keystone"},{"line_number":114,"context_line":"will check the policy as part for validating the signature."}],"source_content_type":"text/x-rst","patch_set":2,"id":"da86d52c_e7b8acea","line":111,"in_reply_to":"da86d52c_b1466979","updated":"2015-02-15 15:21:50.000000000","message":"I will fix it.","commit_id":"a1a79d465f67e42c7ed5e1bf6c059a5637d96477"},{"author":{"_account_id":2903,"name":"Morgan Fainberg","email":"morgan.fainberg@gmail.com","username":"mdrnstm"},"change_message_id":"16d425948e96dfd116079710c80e649613a88f8e","unresolved":false,"context_lines":[{"line_number":111,"context_line":"if user is trying to fool the system by any means."},{"line_number":112,"context_line":""},{"line_number":113,"context_line":"Token revocation will be done using attribute based revocation policy, Keystone"},{"line_number":114,"context_line":"will check the policy as part for validating the signature."},{"line_number":115,"context_line":""},{"line_number":116,"context_line":"Note: Protection and management of the HMAC keys are not covered in this"},{"line_number":117,"context_line":"specification. Following are some high level thoughts:"}],"source_content_type":"text/x-rst","patch_set":2,"id":"da86d52c_117e55af","line":114,"updated":"2015-02-12 01:42:49.000000000","message":"Recommend rephrasing to say \"Revocation Events\" as that is the system in keystone. It is unclear what \"attribute based revocation policy\" is here.","commit_id":"a1a79d465f67e42c7ed5e1bf6c059a5637d96477"},{"author":{"_account_id":994,"name":"Arvind Tiwari","email":"arvindt7@gmail.com","username":"arvind-tiwari"},"change_message_id":"01546a2f2aad35e866e2d773255314bd92b2d3e0","unresolved":false,"context_lines":[{"line_number":111,"context_line":"if user is trying to fool the system by any means."},{"line_number":112,"context_line":""},{"line_number":113,"context_line":"Token revocation will be done using attribute based revocation policy, Keystone"},{"line_number":114,"context_line":"will check the policy as part for validating the signature."},{"line_number":115,"context_line":""},{"line_number":116,"context_line":"Note: Protection and management of the HMAC keys are not covered in this"},{"line_number":117,"context_line":"specification. Following are some high level thoughts:"}],"source_content_type":"text/x-rst","patch_set":2,"id":"da86d52c_67ccbc8b","line":114,"in_reply_to":"da86d52c_117e55af","updated":"2015-02-15 15:21:50.000000000","message":"I will fix it.","commit_id":"a1a79d465f67e42c7ed5e1bf6c059a5637d96477"},{"author":{"_account_id":2903,"name":"Morgan Fainberg","email":"morgan.fainberg@gmail.com","username":"mdrnstm"},"change_message_id":"6274d4e0d711439f3ec75ef1ecdff463e1c3e141","unresolved":false,"context_lines":[{"line_number":86,"context_line":"and token expiration time. Example below:"},{"line_number":87,"context_line":""},{"line_number":88,"context_line":"Message \u003d \u0027auth_type:user_id:project_id:endpoint_URL:roles:service_id:"},{"line_number":89,"context_line":"           region:audit_id:expiration_time\u0027"},{"line_number":90,"context_line":""},{"line_number":91,"context_line":"This way HMAC signature will be bind to user, project, expiration time etc."},{"line_number":92,"context_line":"Extra attributes can be added to the message to make the signature more"}],"source_content_type":"text/x-rst","patch_set":3,"id":"da86d52c_e2489a8c","line":89,"updated":"2015-02-15 19:28:13.000000000","message":"FEderation information, Oauth informatino, Trust id, etc are all used for revocation events and to properly handle authorization construction.\n\nThis still looks to be incompatible with today\u0027s workflow, see my comment below.","commit_id":"26a4bc928eecaf5a3a7a52b7734a6d6dcd76687a"},{"author":{"_account_id":994,"name":"Arvind Tiwari","email":"arvindt7@gmail.com","username":"arvind-tiwari"},"change_message_id":"c0d1173fa98398a31aec7d123641eade320e6378","unresolved":false,"context_lines":[{"line_number":86,"context_line":"and token expiration time. Example below:"},{"line_number":87,"context_line":""},{"line_number":88,"context_line":"Message \u003d \u0027auth_type:user_id:project_id:endpoint_URL:roles:service_id:"},{"line_number":89,"context_line":"           region:audit_id:expiration_time\u0027"},{"line_number":90,"context_line":""},{"line_number":91,"context_line":"This way HMAC signature will be bind to user, project, expiration time etc."},{"line_number":92,"context_line":"Extra attributes can be added to the message to make the signature more"}],"source_content_type":"text/x-rst","patch_set":3,"id":"da86d52c_ed49418f","line":89,"in_reply_to":"da86d52c_c870f475","updated":"2015-02-17 00:32:10.000000000","message":"Morgan, I am trying to understand how the groups are playing role while token validation from middleware. As per my understanding service/middleware validates the token from Keystone to make sure the user authenticity and to validate claim for the endpoint.\n\nDo we really care (while token validation by middleware) what authentication method was used or which groups user is member of?\n\nI am sorry if I am missing something.\n\nthose groups will be there in token response as usual.","commit_id":"26a4bc928eecaf5a3a7a52b7734a6d6dcd76687a"},{"author":{"_account_id":2903,"name":"Morgan Fainberg","email":"morgan.fainberg@gmail.com","username":"mdrnstm"},"change_message_id":"4e025f5e7acad8c6636eb1a6f8a8b41c00138b3b","unresolved":false,"context_lines":[{"line_number":86,"context_line":"and token expiration time. Example below:"},{"line_number":87,"context_line":""},{"line_number":88,"context_line":"Message \u003d \u0027auth_type:user_id:project_id:endpoint_URL:roles:service_id:"},{"line_number":89,"context_line":"           region:audit_id:expiration_time\u0027"},{"line_number":90,"context_line":""},{"line_number":91,"context_line":"This way HMAC signature will be bind to user, project, expiration time etc."},{"line_number":92,"context_line":"Extra attributes can be added to the message to make the signature more"}],"source_content_type":"text/x-rst","patch_set":3,"id":"da86d52c_c870f475","line":89,"in_reply_to":"da86d52c_e2489a8c","updated":"2015-02-16 19:15:01.000000000","message":"This includes the groups list from the federated tokens, see https://github.com/openstack/keystone-specs/blob/master/api/v3/identity-api-v3-os-federation-ext.rst#request-a-scoped-os-federation-token","commit_id":"26a4bc928eecaf5a3a7a52b7734a6d6dcd76687a"},{"author":{"_account_id":2903,"name":"Morgan Fainberg","email":"morgan.fainberg@gmail.com","username":"mdrnstm"},"change_message_id":"3bb916fd8745c6a1395483fec5e6679b80eea8d5","unresolved":false,"context_lines":[{"line_number":86,"context_line":"and token expiration time. Example below:"},{"line_number":87,"context_line":""},{"line_number":88,"context_line":"Message \u003d \u0027auth_type:user_id:project_id:endpoint_URL:roles:service_id:"},{"line_number":89,"context_line":"           region:audit_id:expiration_time\u0027"},{"line_number":90,"context_line":""},{"line_number":91,"context_line":"This way HMAC signature will be bind to user, project, expiration time etc."},{"line_number":92,"context_line":"Extra attributes can be added to the message to make the signature more"}],"source_content_type":"text/x-rst","patch_set":3,"id":"da86d52c_f681124e","line":89,"in_reply_to":"da86d52c_ed49418f","updated":"2015-02-17 03:25:15.000000000","message":"The issue is that these groups are not something keystone can construct w/o the SAML assertion, so the group info needs to be carried. The KLWT (formerly AE tokens) have to address the same issue.","commit_id":"26a4bc928eecaf5a3a7a52b7734a6d6dcd76687a"},{"author":{"_account_id":994,"name":"Arvind Tiwari","email":"arvindt7@gmail.com","username":"arvind-tiwari"},"change_message_id":"e7882c6b59fc20b92b724b8f58078db54055fe7b","unresolved":false,"context_lines":[{"line_number":86,"context_line":"and token expiration time. Example below:"},{"line_number":87,"context_line":""},{"line_number":88,"context_line":"Message \u003d \u0027auth_type:user_id:project_id:endpoint_URL:roles:service_id:"},{"line_number":89,"context_line":"           region:audit_id:expiration_time\u0027"},{"line_number":90,"context_line":""},{"line_number":91,"context_line":"This way HMAC signature will be bind to user, project, expiration time etc."},{"line_number":92,"context_line":"Extra attributes can be added to the message to make the signature more"}],"source_content_type":"text/x-rst","patch_set":3,"id":"da86d52c_2e1a5418","line":89,"in_reply_to":"da86d52c_f681124e","updated":"2015-02-17 18:04:07.000000000","message":"Need more understanding here. working on.","commit_id":"26a4bc928eecaf5a3a7a52b7734a6d6dcd76687a"},{"author":{"_account_id":2903,"name":"Morgan Fainberg","email":"morgan.fainberg@gmail.com","username":"mdrnstm"},"change_message_id":"6274d4e0d711439f3ec75ef1ecdff463e1c3e141","unresolved":false,"context_lines":[{"line_number":102,"context_line":""},{"line_number":103,"context_line":"It is client\u0027s responsibility to provide endpoint and associated signature"},{"line_number":104,"context_line":"if service wants to communicate with another service. e.g. To spin up a VM"},{"line_number":105,"context_line":"Nova needs talk to Glance."},{"line_number":106,"context_line":""},{"line_number":107,"context_line":"Middleware will build the message using the information provided by user and"},{"line_number":108,"context_line":"call Keystone along with signature and the message. Keystone will use the"}],"source_content_type":"text/x-rst","patch_set":3,"id":"da86d52c_226c7208","line":105,"updated":"2015-02-15 19:28:13.000000000","message":"So the user needs to have 2 tokens to spin up a VM, one to talk to nova and one for nova to talk to glance?\n\nPlease be as specific as possible here. Today, if nova wants to talk to glance, it just does it (using the user\u0027s provided token in many cases). This is just not clear to me how it works. Perhaps an ASCII-Flow diagram would help?","commit_id":"26a4bc928eecaf5a3a7a52b7734a6d6dcd76687a"},{"author":{"_account_id":994,"name":"Arvind Tiwari","email":"arvindt7@gmail.com","username":"arvind-tiwari"},"change_message_id":"c0d1173fa98398a31aec7d123641eade320e6378","unresolved":false,"context_lines":[{"line_number":102,"context_line":""},{"line_number":103,"context_line":"It is client\u0027s responsibility to provide endpoint and associated signature"},{"line_number":104,"context_line":"if service wants to communicate with another service. e.g. To spin up a VM"},{"line_number":105,"context_line":"Nova needs talk to Glance."},{"line_number":106,"context_line":""},{"line_number":107,"context_line":"Middleware will build the message using the information provided by user and"},{"line_number":108,"context_line":"call Keystone along with signature and the message. Keystone will use the"}],"source_content_type":"text/x-rst","patch_set":3,"id":"da86d52c_4d47ad77","line":105,"in_reply_to":"da86d52c_226c7208","updated":"2015-02-17 00:32:10.000000000","message":"I will fix it","commit_id":"26a4bc928eecaf5a3a7a52b7734a6d6dcd76687a"},{"author":{"_account_id":2903,"name":"Morgan Fainberg","email":"morgan.fainberg@gmail.com","username":"mdrnstm"},"change_message_id":"6274d4e0d711439f3ec75ef1ecdff463e1c3e141","unresolved":false,"context_lines":[{"line_number":110,"context_line":"middleware. Message digest will generated using same HMAC-Key and hash"},{"line_number":111,"context_line":"algorithm (e.g. Sha-256, Sha-512) which was originally used by Keystone to"},{"line_number":112,"context_line":"generate the signature. In this validation process HMAC-Key to generate the"},{"line_number":113,"context_line":"signature will never leave Keystone."},{"line_number":114,"context_line":""},{"line_number":115,"context_line":"Validation will be done by matching the message digest with the signature,"},{"line_number":116,"context_line":"originally provided by user. Signature validation would prove the user"}],"source_content_type":"text/x-rst","patch_set":3,"id":"da86d52c_62758acb","line":113,"updated":"2015-02-15 19:28:13.000000000","message":"much better phrasing, I see what you\u0027re driving at now. Thanks!","commit_id":"26a4bc928eecaf5a3a7a52b7734a6d6dcd76687a"},{"author":{"_account_id":994,"name":"Arvind Tiwari","email":"arvindt7@gmail.com","username":"arvind-tiwari"},"change_message_id":"c0d1173fa98398a31aec7d123641eade320e6378","unresolved":false,"context_lines":[{"line_number":110,"context_line":"middleware. Message digest will generated using same HMAC-Key and hash"},{"line_number":111,"context_line":"algorithm (e.g. Sha-256, Sha-512) which was originally used by Keystone to"},{"line_number":112,"context_line":"generate the signature. In this validation process HMAC-Key to generate the"},{"line_number":113,"context_line":"signature will never leave Keystone."},{"line_number":114,"context_line":""},{"line_number":115,"context_line":"Validation will be done by matching the message digest with the signature,"},{"line_number":116,"context_line":"originally provided by user. Signature validation would prove the user"}],"source_content_type":"text/x-rst","patch_set":3,"id":"da86d52c_8d58c558","line":113,"in_reply_to":"da86d52c_62758acb","updated":"2015-02-17 00:32:10.000000000","message":"thanks","commit_id":"26a4bc928eecaf5a3a7a52b7734a6d6dcd76687a"},{"author":{"_account_id":6804,"name":"bruce-benjamin","email":"bruce.benjamin@jhuapl.edu","username":"bruce-benjamin"},"change_message_id":"d2f1abea8cfd8d6e790476b70c5edc08ed9cc0ca","unresolved":false,"context_lines":[{"line_number":26,"context_line":"validate temporary access URL for objects."},{"line_number":27,"context_line":""},{"line_number":28,"context_line":"See `Temporary URL \u003chttp://docs.openstack.org/juno/config-reference/content/"},{"line_number":29,"context_line":"object-storage-tempurl.html\u003e`_ for more information on Temporary URL."},{"line_number":30,"context_line":""},{"line_number":31,"context_line":"Problem Description"},{"line_number":32,"context_line":"\u003d\u003d\u003d\u003d\u003d\u003d\u003d\u003d\u003d\u003d\u003d\u003d\u003d\u003d\u003d\u003d\u003d\u003d\u003d"}],"source_content_type":"text/x-rst","patch_set":8,"id":"9a80dd14_b51ca714","line":29,"updated":"2015-05-04 15:13:06.000000000","message":"This appears to be a bad link","commit_id":"786703f5a53f9423cb21371cbad89cd8d8019bb4"},{"author":{"_account_id":6802,"name":"Joel Coffman","email":"jmc7tp@gmail.com","username":"joel-coffman"},"change_message_id":"add778d2ec73c6bcd9ef7cf988235d45e00a8cad","unresolved":false,"context_lines":[{"line_number":41,"context_line":"the claim by validating the token from Keystone."},{"line_number":42,"context_line":""},{"line_number":43,"context_line":"``PKI Tokens``: These are PKI encrypted form of the UUID tokens provided to the"},{"line_number":44,"context_line":"users after successful authentication. Users have to presents the entire cypher"},{"line_number":45,"context_line":"text to the service to access the resources. Claim validation will be done by"},{"line_number":46,"context_line":"decrypting the cypher text and validating the signature. In a cloud deployment,"},{"line_number":47,"context_line":"all services (Keystone, Compute, Cinder…) share the same PKI keys to make the"}],"source_content_type":"text/x-rst","patch_set":8,"id":"9a80dd14_32a4b64a","line":44,"updated":"2015-03-17 19:27:24.000000000","message":"nit: cypher -\u003e cipher","commit_id":"786703f5a53f9423cb21371cbad89cd8d8019bb4"},{"author":{"_account_id":6802,"name":"Joel Coffman","email":"jmc7tp@gmail.com","username":"joel-coffman"},"change_message_id":"add778d2ec73c6bcd9ef7cf988235d45e00a8cad","unresolved":false,"context_lines":[{"line_number":64,"context_line":"  service over request header. Growing number of regions and availability zones"},{"line_number":65,"context_line":"  in a cloud setup can easily increase the size of token data to allowed limit."},{"line_number":66,"context_line":""},{"line_number":67,"context_line":"* Services have to share same PKI artifacts (private key) that can cause as big"},{"line_number":68,"context_line":"  security gap."},{"line_number":69,"context_line":""},{"line_number":70,"context_line":"Proposed Change"}],"source_content_type":"text/x-rst","patch_set":8,"id":"9a80dd14_b5a7b00a","line":67,"updated":"2015-03-17 19:27:24.000000000","message":"Services have access to Keystone\u0027s signing certificate and CA certificate but not the corresponding private key. See\n* https://www.mirantis.com/blog/understanding-openstack-authentication-keystone-pki/\n* http://bodenr.blogspot.com/2014/03/openstack-keystone-workflow-token.html","commit_id":"786703f5a53f9423cb21371cbad89cd8d8019bb4"},{"author":{"_account_id":6802,"name":"Joel Coffman","email":"jmc7tp@gmail.com","username":"joel-coffman"},"change_message_id":"add778d2ec73c6bcd9ef7cf988235d45e00a8cad","unresolved":false,"context_lines":[{"line_number":65,"context_line":"  in a cloud setup can easily increase the size of token data to allowed limit."},{"line_number":66,"context_line":""},{"line_number":67,"context_line":"* Services have to share same PKI artifacts (private key) that can cause as big"},{"line_number":68,"context_line":"  security gap."},{"line_number":69,"context_line":""},{"line_number":70,"context_line":"Proposed Change"},{"line_number":71,"context_line":"\u003d\u003d\u003d\u003d\u003d\u003d\u003d\u003d\u003d\u003d\u003d\u003d\u003d\u003d\u003d"}],"source_content_type":"text/x-rst","patch_set":8,"id":"9a80dd14_95c9ccae","line":68,"updated":"2015-03-17 19:27:24.000000000","message":"Access to the information required to validate the signature (see above) shouldn\u0027t pose any security risks. Otherwise, it would be trivial to forge PKI tokens in OpenStack.","commit_id":"786703f5a53f9423cb21371cbad89cd8d8019bb4"},{"author":{"_account_id":6802,"name":"Joel Coffman","email":"jmc7tp@gmail.com","username":"joel-coffman"},"change_message_id":"add778d2ec73c6bcd9ef7cf988235d45e00a8cad","unresolved":false,"context_lines":[{"line_number":102,"context_line":""},{"line_number":103,"context_line":"It is client\u0027s responsibility to provide endpoint and associated signature"},{"line_number":104,"context_line":"if service wants to communicate with another service. e.g. To spin up a VM"},{"line_number":105,"context_line":"Nova needs talk to Glance."},{"line_number":106,"context_line":""},{"line_number":107,"context_line":"Middleware will build the message using the information provided by user and"},{"line_number":108,"context_line":"call Keystone along with signature and the message. Keystone will use the"}],"source_content_type":"text/x-rst","patch_set":8,"id":"9a80dd14_3599007a","line":105,"updated":"2015-03-17 19:27:24.000000000","message":"By implication, the client must know all the endpoints that a given request may touch. For example, Nova booting an image will probably involve Glance, Glance may be storing images in Swift, etc. This process doesn\u0027t seem scalable, as it would be difficult for a client to know all endpoints in advance. (And if the endpoints are determined dynamically, then the result is a lot of network requests -- maybe even more overhead than the \"problem\" of UUID or PKI tokens.)","commit_id":"786703f5a53f9423cb21371cbad89cd8d8019bb4"},{"author":{"_account_id":6802,"name":"Joel Coffman","email":"jmc7tp@gmail.com","username":"joel-coffman"},"change_message_id":"add778d2ec73c6bcd9ef7cf988235d45e00a8cad","unresolved":false,"context_lines":[{"line_number":104,"context_line":"if service wants to communicate with another service. e.g. To spin up a VM"},{"line_number":105,"context_line":"Nova needs talk to Glance."},{"line_number":106,"context_line":""},{"line_number":107,"context_line":"Middleware will build the message using the information provided by user and"},{"line_number":108,"context_line":"call Keystone along with signature and the message. Keystone will use the"},{"line_number":109,"context_line":"message to generate the digest and match it with the signature provided by"},{"line_number":110,"context_line":"middleware. Message digest will generated using same HMAC-Key and hash"}],"source_content_type":"text/x-rst","patch_set":8,"id":"9a80dd14_558e7428","line":107,"updated":"2015-03-17 19:27:24.000000000","message":"What is meant by \u0027middleware\u0027? It would be helpful to include an example...","commit_id":"786703f5a53f9423cb21371cbad89cd8d8019bb4"},{"author":{"_account_id":6802,"name":"Joel Coffman","email":"jmc7tp@gmail.com","username":"joel-coffman"},"change_message_id":"add778d2ec73c6bcd9ef7cf988235d45e00a8cad","unresolved":false,"context_lines":[{"line_number":111,"context_line":"algorithm (e.g. Sha-256, Sha-512) which was originally used by Keystone to"},{"line_number":112,"context_line":"generate the signature."},{"line_number":113,"context_line":"In this validation process HMAC-Key to generate the signature will never"},{"line_number":114,"context_line":"leave Keystone."},{"line_number":115,"context_line":""},{"line_number":116,"context_line":"Validation will be done by matching the message digest with the signature,"},{"line_number":117,"context_line":"originally provided by user. Signature validation would prove the user"}],"source_content_type":"text/x-rst","patch_set":8,"id":"9a80dd14_381495e8","line":114,"updated":"2015-03-17 19:27:24.000000000","message":"Please clarify: are all HMAC keys stored / available *solely* to Keystone?","commit_id":"786703f5a53f9423cb21371cbad89cd8d8019bb4"},{"author":{"_account_id":6802,"name":"Joel Coffman","email":"jmc7tp@gmail.com","username":"joel-coffman"},"change_message_id":"add778d2ec73c6bcd9ef7cf988235d45e00a8cad","unresolved":false,"context_lines":[{"line_number":128,"context_line":"information to the middleware."},{"line_number":129,"context_line":""},{"line_number":130,"context_line":"3. Middleware will be responsible for reconstructing the message and calling"},{"line_number":131,"context_line":"Keystone to validate the signature."},{"line_number":132,"context_line":""},{"line_number":133,"context_line":"Token revocation will be handled by revocation events. As there is no token"},{"line_number":134,"context_line":"UUID, we need to consider policy based revocation event."}],"source_content_type":"text/x-rst","patch_set":8,"id":"9a80dd14_d8f7f9d2","line":131,"updated":"2015-03-17 19:27:24.000000000","message":"I\u0027m having trouble following this explanation and reconciling it with some of the issues of UUID tokens mentioned previously.\n\nIf I understand correctly, this model requires Keystone to validate the HMAC of every message. My perceptual was that the repeated validation requests were one of the reasons prompting the move from UUID to PKI tokens. This scheme doesn\u0027t seem to reduce the number of Keystone requests so the major benefit is not storing all the UUIDs in Keystone\u0027s database? Please let me know if I\u0027m misunderstanding something; otherwise, this benefit should be stated explicitly at the beginning of the spec (because I\u0027m not seeing other significant benefits).","commit_id":"786703f5a53f9423cb21371cbad89cd8d8019bb4"},{"author":{"_account_id":6802,"name":"Joel Coffman","email":"jmc7tp@gmail.com","username":"joel-coffman"},"change_message_id":"add778d2ec73c6bcd9ef7cf988235d45e00a8cad","unresolved":false,"context_lines":[{"line_number":132,"context_line":""},{"line_number":133,"context_line":"Token revocation will be handled by revocation events. As there is no token"},{"line_number":134,"context_line":"UUID, we need to consider policy based revocation event."},{"line_number":135,"context_line":"e.g. {revoke token for `user_id` and `project_id` before `expiration_time`}"},{"line_number":136,"context_line":""},{"line_number":137,"context_line":""},{"line_number":138,"context_line":"Note: Protection and management of the HMAC keys are not covered in this"}],"source_content_type":"text/x-rst","patch_set":8,"id":"9a80dd14_557834f8","line":135,"updated":"2015-03-17 19:27:24.000000000","message":"Is this revocation policy sufficiently granular? Are there cases where a user might have many tokens from before the expiration time, only one of which should be revoked?","commit_id":"786703f5a53f9423cb21371cbad89cd8d8019bb4"},{"author":{"_account_id":6802,"name":"Joel Coffman","email":"jmc7tp@gmail.com","username":"joel-coffman"},"change_message_id":"add778d2ec73c6bcd9ef7cf988235d45e00a8cad","unresolved":false,"context_lines":[{"line_number":140,"context_line":""},{"line_number":141,"context_line":"1. Use of HSM infrastructure to protect the key."},{"line_number":142,"context_line":"2. Signature generation and validation will be done inside HSM."},{"line_number":143,"context_line":"3. HMAC keys per endpoints and key rotation."},{"line_number":144,"context_line":""},{"line_number":145,"context_line":"Alternatives"},{"line_number":146,"context_line":"------------"}],"source_content_type":"text/x-rst","patch_set":8,"id":"9a80dd14_58878912","line":143,"updated":"2015-03-17 19:27:24.000000000","message":"Management of the HMAC keys is a significant issue: it must be done securely or else this scheme won\u0027t provide the desired security properties. I think some additional details should be provided -- e.g., could Barbican be used for secure key storage and retrieval of the HMAC keys?","commit_id":"786703f5a53f9423cb21371cbad89cd8d8019bb4"},{"author":{"_account_id":6802,"name":"Joel Coffman","email":"jmc7tp@gmail.com","username":"joel-coffman"},"change_message_id":"add778d2ec73c6bcd9ef7cf988235d45e00a8cad","unresolved":false,"context_lines":[{"line_number":159,"context_line":""},{"line_number":160,"context_line":"Token response will have added fields for HMAC signature and expiration."},{"line_number":161,"context_line":"Note: We can use the expiration field from token for signature expiration"},{"line_number":162,"context_line":"and get rid of one extra filed."},{"line_number":163,"context_line":""},{"line_number":164,"context_line":"Following is an example of token response with HMAC signature."},{"line_number":165,"context_line":""}],"source_content_type":"text/x-rst","patch_set":8,"id":"9a80dd14_af84c10b","line":162,"updated":"2015-03-17 19:27:24.000000000","message":"typo: filed -\u003e field","commit_id":"786703f5a53f9423cb21371cbad89cd8d8019bb4"}]}
